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Abstract: A logistic function framework is used to allocate European Union Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) direct payments to farmers among the different member 
states. Total CAP expenditure is the starting point for the process, which contemplates 
two phases. In Phase 1 expenditure is allocated  by  taking into consideration the 
economic dimension of farms in each country. In Phase 2 the amount allocated to each 
member state is further modulated to accommodate both economic efficiency and green 
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In  a not very distant past,  Soares (2005)  proposed an alternative scheme for 
computing direct payments   to farmers under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
Regulation 2237/2003.  By then the idea was to find a substitute for the allocation of 
direct payments on an historical basis, which  appeared as a very inefficient way of 
supporting farm income.  Farmers do not get any incentive to modernise  the 
technologies used or adapt to new market conditions if they receive the same amount of 
subsidy they got in the past, no matter the type of production decisions they choose to 
take. In addition it was pointed out that the growing environment concerns, namely in 
terms of green house gas (GHG) emissions, were not also taken into any consideration 
under the above mentioned Regulation. 
The proposed solution was to “modulate” the historical payments by means of 
computing direct payments coefficients  as a logistic function of deviations from 
European Union (EU) mean or mode values of economic and environment indicators. 
Each member state would receive a percentage of its historical allowance according to 
the economic performance, the farm income and the level of GHG emissions. Economic 
efficiency had a positive sign in the logistic relationship, while farm income and GHG 
emissions both carried a negative one.
 1 
The results seemed interesting, given the fact that countries with more efficient and 
intensive input using agricultural sectors, with higher farm income but also higher level 
of GHG emissions ended up by receiving less than their historical value. This was for 
                                                 
1 The negative sign in farm income is justified by the modulation of income support. The full text of the 
exercise can be find  at http://www.icer.it/menu/f_papers.html under the year 2005   3 
instance the case of the case of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. On the contrary, countries with less intensive 
agricultural sectors, generating smaller farm incomes but with much less negative 
environment impact, were assigned a higher subsidy level than in the past. This was the 
case with Austria, Greece, Portugal or Finland. These findings are in line with the view 
that the farm income support is mainly justifiable in terms of the internalisation of 
positive externalities. 
One important question remained nevertheless unanswered. Why should the starting 
point to the entire exercise be the historical level of subsidies? Moreover, for the 12 new 
member countries that recently joined the EU there are no historic values.  
The most recent resolutions coming out of the European Council of Ministers of 
Agriculture seem to indicate that, in the medium-long run, the so called Single Farm 
Payment (SFP) is the most important, if not the only CAP policy instrument left. This 
means that the political decision makers no longer view the support of farm income as 
linked to the production process, either through price support, market interventions, 
supply control or direct payments. It is the multifunctionality of agriculture that makes 
it eligible for support as provider of services that society is willing to pay for, namely 
landscape conservation and environment protection. The new questions are then:  
-  how much is society willing to pay? 
-  and how should it be allocated among member states? 
      The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model 
used. In section 3 model implementation and the results obtained are discussed. The last 
section presents some concluding remarks. 
  
 
2. The model  
 
The basic structure of the model used is similar to that used in Soares (2005). The 
logistic function 
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where  g   ,  b   , and  a  remain the key elements in computing the direct payments 
coefficients, the first two being positive, while  a  can be positive or negative .
2 
The coefficients    i y   depend on the deviations 
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where   i x     is the  country  i  value  for the indicator chosen (economic dimension,   
economic efficiency or GHG emissions) and   x
*   is the average of country values 
indicator. 
How can this instrument be used to address the two questions formulated above? 
The amount of funds society is wiling to allocate to the agricultural sector as 
payment for the internalization of the positive externalities created is clearly a political 
decision. Thus the model can only reflect the consequences of the different choices 
made. As a starting point we used the total CAP expenditure in 2005
3 as the  total 
amount the  EU  is willing to pay. Its distribution among member states can  then  be 
handled within the model framework.  
If the future of CAP is to fully implement the SFP, then the simplest the solution 
adopted the better. Paying farmers a given amount of money per cultivated  hectare 
looks like a straightforward way of doing it.  
A per hectare payment is however easily criticisable on the grounds that agricultural 
land is very heterogeneous both within countries and among countries and thus the 
payment  would not reward the level of economic activity. This problem can however 
be mitigated in our model by computing   appropriate    i y   coefficients. 
Total payments can be written as a weighted sum of the  n  country receipts, e.g. 













                    (3)                                                                     
where   i D   represents country dimension (in hectares),  AP is the average payment in 
the EU (euros / ha) and the country weights are the   i y  coefficients.  
                                                 
2 For a more complete description of the logistic function and its properties in this context see 
Soares(2005) 
3 2005 is the most recent year for which there is data on CAP expenditure and simultaneously on GHG 
emissions for the 25 EU member states included in the model. For Bulgaria and Romania the required 
data is not entirely available.   5 
The  i y  weights are then used to modulate country payments. It suffices to take   i x  
as the average economic dimension of farms (total ESU / no. of holdings) and a positive 
a . Thus, countries with above the average  (x
*) economic dimension of farms will have 
a  i y  weight which is greater than one, and those with economic dimension below the 
average will get a smaller than one   i y .
4 
To compute the   i y   one needs to know the values of  a  ,  b   and  g . If we take  
i x ¶  as the deviations from the average, then     g b = + 1   and only  a  and   b  remain 
unknown. From the logistic curve we know that   b   is the value of the upper asymptote, 
e. g., the highest value the function can reach. In our context   b   is then the maximum 
percentage the modulation coefficient is allowed to reach. For example if     1 . 0 = b   it 
means that no country can be paid more than 10% above its non weighted payment.  
Several simulations for the value of   b   can be performed, and for each of them the 
solution of equation (3) gives the value of   a . 
It is worth noting that,  in this way,  a  represents the  steepness of the logistic 
function that is compatible with the chosen value of   b   and, moreover, guarantees that 
total payments to countries are equal to the desired TP level. 
Once known the value of   a   it is possible to compute each of the terms in equation 
(3) summation corresponding to the  n  country payments corresponding to the chosen 
value of   b . 
Up to this point the economic dimension was the only indicator affecting the 
allocation of direct payments to member states. The other two indicators – economic 
efficiency and GHG emissions – may now be used to modulate the individual country 
payments. Adopting the already used values of  a  and  b   modulation coefficients can 
be obtained for each country payment by computing new   i y  as 
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with                    2 1 1 g g b + = +   ,    0 1 > a     ,    0 2 < a     
                                                 
4 The higher economic dimension in terms of ESU/no. of holdings reflects the higher intensity of 
production and consequently the different production capacity of land.   6 
and                       i u d   being the deviation from average economic efficiency  
                       i v d   being the deviation from average GHG emissions. 
Multiplying each country payment previously obtained by this new   i y  one gets the 
total amount of single farm payments each member state is allowed, taking into account 
the economic dimension of its farms, its economic efficiency and the level of GHG 
emissions the agricultural sector is responsible for. 
  
3. Model implementation and results 
 
The data used in the model was entirely taken from the EUROSTAT database. As 
already mentioned, 2005 is the most recent year for which data on all the indicators used 
is available. In addition, Bulgaria and Romania were not included in the study for the 
lack of required data. 
For the other 25 EU member states the three indicators and its deviations from the 
mean were computed and can be found in the Appendix.  
As also mentioned the total  2005 CAP expenditure  –  52,659.6 Mio EUR  –  is 
assumed as the total amount EU society is willing to pay to compensate the agricultural 
sector for the positive externalities generated. From Table 1 below the last row of 
column 6 shows that if the entire CAP expenditure was to be divided by total area each 
hectare would receive about 339 EUR. And if this rule was applied to each and every 
country they would receive the amounts shown in column 7. Percentages in the last 
column of the table clearly indicate that there would be a sizable redistribution of funds 
among member s tates, which comes as no surprise given the well known land 
heterogeneity among and within countries. It also not surprising that the new member 
states from central  and Eastern  Europe would all be allocated considerably higher 
amounts than those effectively received in 2005. The explanation lies on the fact that 
these new entries were getting in 2005 much smaller per hectare amounts than the older 
members states. So the allocation on a 25 average basis does necessarily favour them. If 
we confine our analysis to the old 15 members the variations in potential receipts are 
much more limited.  As expected countries with  highest production intensity like 
Belgium and the Netherlands suffer higher cuts. Although not having highly  intensive 
agricultural sectors Greece and Malta also suffer drastic reductions because these two 
countries had the highest  level of  per hectare funds received in 2005. To tackle this   7 
problem the first phase of model implementation is then to modulate the per hectare 
payment of 338.95 EUR using equation (3). 
For that matter we computed three values of  a   by solving equation (3) for three 
different values of   beta:   05 . 0 = b ,    1 . 0 = b    and   25 . 0 = b . This means that the 
maximum acceptable increase in direct payments (over the per hectare basis amount) is 
respectively 5, 10 and 25 percent.  
 
Table 1 - CAP Expenditure 2005           
   CAP Expenditure   Agricultural   Expenditure  Expenditure on  
    (Mio EUR)  Area  / ha  per ha basis  
   Guarantee  Guidance  Total  (ha)  (EUR / ha)  (Mio EUR)  % of 2005 
AT Austria  1,265.7  20.6  1,286.3  3,266,240  393.82  1,107.1  86 
BE Belgium  1,034.5  8.1  1,042.6  1,385,580  752.46  469.6  45 
CY Cyprus  58.8  0.0  58.8  151,500  388.12  51.4  87 
CZ Czech Republic  463.8  55.6  519.4  3,557,790  145.99  1,205.9  232 
DE Germany   6,503.1  511.3  7,014.4  17,035,220  411.76  5,774.1  82 
DK Denmark  1,224.9  3.1  1,228.0  2,707,690  453.52  917.8  75 
EE Estonia  77.4  18.6  96.0  828,930  115.81  281.0  293 
ES Spain  6,406.5  935.2  7,341.7  24,855,130  295.38  8,424.7  115 
FI Finland  902.9  44.6  947.5  2,263,560  418.59  767.2  81 
FR France  9,968.9  137.1  10,106.0  27,590,940  366.28  9,352.0  93 
GR Greece  2,754.0  521.9  3,275.9  3,983,790  822.31  1,350.3  41 
HU Hungary  716.8  104.4  821.2  4,266,550  192.47  1,446.2  176 
IE Ireland  1,806.2  20.9  1,827.1  4,219,380  433.03  1,430.2  78 
IT Italy  5,499.7  580.4  6,080.1  12,707,850  478.45  4,307.3  71 
LT Lithuania  291.2  41.8  333.0  2,792,040  119.27  946.4  284 
LU Luxembourg   45.0  0.4  45.4  129,130  351.58  43.8  96 
LV Latvia  137.5  33.0  170.5  1,701,680  100.20  576.8  338 
MT Malta  9.9  1.4  11.3  10,250  1,102.44  3.5  31 
NL Netherlands  1,256.3  17.5  1,273.8  1,958,060  650.54  663.7  52 
PL Poland  1,839.0  398.2  2,237.2  14,754,880  151.62  5,001.2  224 
PT Portugal  891.9  341.4  1,233.3  3,679,590  335.17  1,247.2  101 
SE Sweden  956.3  24.9  981.2  3,192,450  307.35  1,082.1  110 
SI Slovenia  127.3  7.9  135.2  485,430  278.52  164.5  122 
SK Slovakia  247.5  60.5  308.0  1,879,490  163.87  637.1  207 
UK United 
Kingdom  4,215.0  70.7  4,285.7  15,956,960  268.58  5,408.6  126 
EU 25  48,700.1  3,959.5  52,659.6  155,360,110  338.95  52,659.6   
Source: "The Agricultural Situation in the Community - Report 2006" and EUROSTAT, Agriculture   
 
The resulting values for  a   are: 
                (i)         05 . 0 = b         ﬁ        52639 . 0 = a  
                (ii)        10 . 0 = b         ﬁ        57925 . 0 = a  
                (iii)       25 . 0 = b         ﬁ        77374 . 0 = a    8 
And the economic dimension modulated payments to the member states 
corresponding to the Phase 1 of model implementation are showing in Table 2.  As 
expected the payments increase for those countries with economic dimension of farms 
above the EU average (Belgium,  Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, France, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom) and decrease for the remaining ones. 
In addition, and in line with the assumptions made, there are no increments above 5, 10 
and 25 percent respectively in situations (i) , (ii) and (iii).  
 
Table 2 - Economic Dimension Modulated Payments (Phase 1)   
      (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
   ß =  0.05  0.10  0.25 
   a =  0.52639  0.57925  0.77374 
   Per ha basis   Modulated payments 
   (Mio EUR)  (Mio EUR)  D%  (Mio EUR)  D%  (Mio EUR)  D% 
AT Austria  1,107.1  1,094.5  -1  1,080.8  -2  1,030.2  -7 
BE Belgium  469.6  482.9  3  497.3  6  548.2  17 
CY Cyprus  51.4  50.2  -2  49.0  -5  44.6  -13 
CZ Czech Republic  1,205.9  1,218.4  1  1,232.1  2  1,282.7  6 
DE Germany   5,774.1  5,888.9  2  6,014.5  4  6,471.4  12 
DK Denmark  917.8  945.3  3  975.2  6  1,080.1  18 
EE Estonia  281.0  274.1  -2  266.7  -5  239.9  -15 
ES Spain  8,424.7  8,366.3  -1  8,302.0  -1  8,065.2  -4 
FI Finland  767.2  767.1  0  766.8  0  766.1  0 
FR France  9,352.0  9,531.7  2  9,747.2  4  10,498.1  12 
GR Greece  1,350.3  1,320.8  -2  1,288.7  -5  1,172.3  -13 
HU Hungary  1,446.2  1,406.1  -3  1,362.6  -6  1,206.9  -17 
IE Ireland  1,430.2  1,421.5  -1  1,411.9  -1  1,376.5  -4 
IT Italy  4,307.3  4,249.2  -1  4,185.4  -3  3,951.9  -8 
LT Lithuania  946.4  919.5  -3  891.0  -6  785.8  -17 
LU Luxembourg   43.8  44.5  2  45.4  4  48.5  11 
LV Latvia  576.8  560.2  -3  542.1  -6  477.7  -17 
MT Malta  3.5  3.4  -2  3.3  -5  3.0  -14 
NL Netherlands  663.7  690.2  4  718.3  8  811.5  22 
PL Poland  5,001.2  4,866.6  -3  4,720.0  -6  4,195.3  -16 
PT Portugal  1,247.2  1,220.0  -2  1,190.3  -5  1,082.8  -13 
SE Sweden  1,082.1  1,078.2  0  1,073.8  -1  1,057.9  -2 
SI Slovenia  164.5  160.4  -3  155.9  -5  139.8  -15 
SK Slovakia  637.1  632.8  -1  609.4  -4  557.0  -13 
UK United Kingdom  5,408.6  5,466.8  1  5,530.1  2  5,766.5  7 
TOTAL  52,659.6  52,659.6  0  52,659.6  0  52,659.6  0 
Source: Phase 1 model results 
       
 
In Phase 2 these results have to be further modulated to reflect both the economic 
efficiency and GHG emissions differences among countries. For that purpose equation 
(4) was used to compute the required modulations coefficients. Which were then   9 
multiplied by the modulated payments obtained in Phase 1 to compute the fully 
modulated payments showing in Table 3. 
A first glance at the table reveals that the total modulated payments are no longer 
equal to the desired total expenditure. This is because the  a  values used in Phase 2 are 
the same as in Phase 1 and thus not necessarily compatible with that requirement. 
Nevertheless the deviations never exceed 1 percent. The second interesting result is that 
the increase in   b   does not cause steady increases or decreases in payments as it 
occurred in Phase 1. This is simply because in Phase 2 two contradictory effects are in 
action: a positive one from economic efficiency ( 0 1 > a ) and a negative one from GHG 
emissions (  0 2 < a ). 
Table 3 - Fully Modulated Payments (Phase 2)         
   (i)  (ii)  (ii) 
      ß = 0.05     ß = 0.10     ß = 0.25 
   g1 = 0.05  a1 = 0.52639  g1 = 0.1  a1 = 0.57925  g1 = 0.25  a1 = 0.77374 
   g2 = 1.00  a2 = - 0.52639  g2 = 1.00  a2 = - 0.57925  g2 = 1.00  a2 = - 0.77374 
  
Fully 
modulated   Fully modulated   Fully modulated  











AT Austria  1.0053  1,100.3  1.0096  1,091.2  1.0179  1,110.8 
BE Belgium  0.9575  462.4  0.9179  456.5  0.8152  372.1 
CY Cyprus  1.0046  50.5  1.0106  49.5  1.0377  51.4 
CZ Czech Republic  1.0085  1,228.8  1.0153  1,251.0  1.0261  1,283.6 
DE Germany   0.9991  5,883.3  0.9980  6,002.5  0.9941  5,967.2 
DK Denmark  0.9968  942.3  0.9938  969.2  0.9863  955.9 
EE Estonia  1.0115  277.3  1.0205  272.1  1.0339  281.4 
ES Spain  1.0095  8,446.1  1.0183  8,453.8  1.0408  8,798.5 
FI Finland  1.0034  769.7  1.0060  771.4  1.0087  778.1 
FR France  1.0021  9,552.2  1.0040  9,786.3  1.0079  9,863.9 
GR Greece  1.0009  1,322.0  1.0022  1,291.5  1.0087  1,302.7 
HU Hungary  1.0112  1,421.9  1.0208  1,390.9  1.0405  1,447.2 
IE Ireland  0.9957  1,415.3  0.9900  1,397.8  0.9641  1,347.6 
IT Italy  1.0051  4,270.9  1.0112  4,232.5  1.0369  4,388.8 
LT Lithuania  1.0116  930.1  1.0209  909.5  1.0355  941.8 
LU Luxembourg   0.9857  43.9  0.9708  44.1  0.9201  40.6 
LV Latvia  1.0122  567.0  1.0218  553.9  1.0372  574.5 
MT Malta  0.9723  3.3  0.9488  3.1  0.8985  2.8 
NL Netherlands  0.8796  607.1  0.7776  558.5  0.5774  322.5 
PL Poland  1.0057  4,894.1  1.0099  4,766.8  1.0147  4,837.0 
PT Portugal  1.0079  1,229.7  1.0146  1,207.6  1.0272  1,240.5 
SE Sweden  1.0027  1,081.1  1.0038  1,077.9  0.9980  1,075.8 
SI Slovenia  0.9966  159.9  0.9922  154.7  0.9720  150.4 
SK Slovakia  1.0105  639.5  1.0189  620.9  1.0323  640.9 
UK United 
Kingdom  1.0050  5,493.9  1.0088  5,578.7  1.0138  5,655.4 
TOTAL     52,792.4     52,892.0     53,431.5 
Source: Phase 2 model results       10 
     But how do these fully modulated payments compare with CAP expenditure in 2005? 
Figures in Table 4 provide not only an answer to this question but also denounce the 
existence of a relationship between these payments and the farm income country levels. 
Looking at the three first columns the values well over and above 100% may be 
surprising or even shocking. Let us not forget though that they refer to the central and 
Eastern Europe countries which, as already mentioned, were receiving relatively small 
per hectare amounts of CAP funds. With a scheme of payments designed on the basis of 
EU 25 average per hectare payments they turn out to be more favoured. This raises the 
question  of the appropriateness of taking the 25 members all together instead of 
performing separate analysis for EU 15 and for the remaining 10 new members. 
 
 





Deviations from 2005 
CAP Expenditure (%) 
   (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
Factor Income   
per Farm        
Deviations from   
EU 25 Average 
(%) 
Factor Income   
per AWU      
Deviations from   
EU 25 Average 
(%) 
AT Austria  -14  -15  -18  4  7 
BE Belgium  -56  -56  -57  192  113 
CY Cyprus  -14  -16  -21  -45  -14 
CZ Czech Republic  137  141  153  103  -45 
DE Germany   -16  -14  -8  181  131 
DK Denmark  -23  -21  -13  127  52 
EE Estonia  189  183  158  -33  -51 
ES Spain  15  15  14  70  79 
FI Finland  -19  -19  -18  108  53 
FR France  -5  -3  5  185  72 
GR Greece  -60  -61  -64  -29  -2 
HU Hungary  73  69  53  -75  -67 
IE Ireland  -23  -23  -27  81  62 
IT Italy  -30  -30  -33  -18  14 
LT Lithuania  179  173  144  -85  -74 
LU Luxembourg   -3  -3  -2  218  96 
LV Latvia  233  225  191  -80  -81 
MT Malta  -71  -72  -76  -57  16 
NL Netherlands  -52  -56  -63  425  115 
PL Poland  119  113  90  -82  -81 
PT Portugal  0  -2  -10  -45  -58 
SE Sweden  10  10  8  40  -75 
SI Slovenia  18  14  0  -57  -63 
SK Slovakia  108  102  87  -53  -68 
UK United Kingdom  28  30  36  168  126 
TOTAL  0.25  0.44  0.69       
Source: Model results and computed from EUROSTAT, Agriculture   
 
   11 
The same argument, but taken on the reverse side, explains the payment cuts for the 
vast majority of EU 15 countries, even if these results have still another explanatory 
reason: many of the EU 15 members have modulation coefficients that are inferior to 
one (see Table 3) due to the fact that their GHG emissions levels are higher. This is for 
instance the case for Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg and 
Netherlands. 
Although the level of payments deviations may seem overestimated its relationship 
with farm income level appears to be evident
5. The general rule that can be drawn from 
Table 4 is that to figures in red in the first 3 columns correspond figures in green in the 
last two ones. This means that, in general, countries receiving more than its 2005 share 
have below the average factor income levels, either per farm or per AWU (Annual 
Work Unit). There are however a few exceptions. 
Cyprus, Greece and Portugal receive less than its 2005 share despite their below the 
average farm income. Spain and the United Kingdom receive more, even having above 
the average farm income levels. One of the possible explanations for these situations is 
that these countries have a combination of economic dimension, economic efficiency 
and GHG emissions indicators that do not comply with the  pattern shown by the 
remaining member states. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The results achieved seem to indicate that he use of a logistic function framework to 
allocate single farm payments within the EU appears to be a useful tool for backing 
policy decisions. Nevertheless a few qualifications have to be made. 
First of all, and as pointed out in the previous section, CAP expenditure within EU 
15 takes into account the implementation of CAP policy measures, both coupled and 
decoupled, for a long period of time. This is not the case for the new 10 member states 
for which the 2005 expenditure only reflects a very limited application of CAP policy 
measures both in terms of coverage and time horizon. As noticed before, this is 
certainly one main cause for the large payments deviations found for these new 
members and suggests the necessity for, in future work, considering two separate sets of 
countries. Alternatively one could assign the new member states the average payment 
                                                 
5 Factor income at basic prices is taken as a proxy for farm income.   12 
per hectare received by EU 15 members,  to  “neutralise the new member’s 
discrepancies”. 
Secondly, a lot more simulations are in order if one wants to benchmark direct 
payments. Not only in terms of the values of the   b   parameter but also in what 
concerns the way  a  is obtained.  Instead of using the economic dimension as a 
modulation factor in the computation of   a ,  either economic efficiency or GHG 
emissions factors can be tried.  Or even try to introduce the three factors in that 
computation.  
Thirdly, CAP expenditure under the Guarantee and Guidance sections could be 
taken separately. This is because the rationale behind the use of the logistic function 
looks more appropriate to allocate farm support linked to the externalities imbedded in 
the production process, while rural development policy measures must accommodate a 
diversity of decision criteria.  
Last, but not least, the results obtained cannot be viewed as precise policy 
































 EU 25 Economic and Environment Indicators (2005)     




























AT Austria  14.78  -0.41  0.77  -0.35  2.957  -0.25 
BE Belgium  65.58  1.63  2.44  1.06  9.201  1.32 
CY Cyprus  6.61  -0.73  1.97  0.66  3.288  -0.17 
CZ Czech Republic  36.28  0.46  0.43  -0.64  2.232  -0.44 
DE Germany   49.74  1.00  1.14  -0.04  4.111  0.04 
DK Denmark  69.81  1.80  1.33  0.12  4.504  0.14 
EE Estonia  4.88  -0.80  0.16  -0.86  1.515  -0.62 
ES Spain  18.53  -0.26  0.80  -0.32  2.121  -0.46 
FI Finland  25.10  0.01  0.78  -0.34  3.297  -0.17 
FR France  50.40  1.02  1.04  -0.13  3.572  -0.10 
GR Greece  6.61  -0.73  1.38  0.17  3.845  -0.03 
HU Hungary  2.72  -0.89  0.46  -0.62  1.670  -0.58 
IE Ireland  19.20  -0.23  0.60  -0.49  4.552  0.15 
IT Italy  12.84  -0.48  1.75  0.47  3.163  -0.20 
LT Lithuania  2.18  -0.91  0.20  -0.83  1.499  -0.62 
LU Luxembourg   46.45  0.87  0.88  -0.26  6.009  0.52 
LV Latvia  2.10  -0.92  0.16  -0.87  1.363  -0.66 
MT Malta  5.29  -0.79  5.72  3.82  7.855  0.98 
NL Netherlands  102.60  3.12  4.29  2.62  14.570  2.68 
PL Poland  3.34  -0.87  0.56  -0.53  2.831  -0.29 
PT Portugal  6.69  -0.73  0.59  -0.50  2.393  -0.40 
SE Sweden  21.53  -0.14  0.51  -0.57  3.368  -0.15 
SI Slovenia  4.59  -0.82  0.73  -0.38  4.432  0.12 
SK Slovakia  7.58  -0.70  0.28  -0.77  1.759  -0.56 
UK United Kingdom  36.93  0.48  0.66  -0.44  2.987  -0.25 
EU25 Average  24.89    1.19    3.964    
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